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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 This case – a case that involves the rights of the 
posthumously conceived children of a deceased wage earner 
and his widow – requires us to consider the intersection of 
new reproductive technologies and what is required to qualify 
for child survivor benefits under the Social Security Act (the 
―Act‖).  It goes without saying that these technologies were 
not within the imagination, much less the contemplation, of 
Congress when the relevant sections of the Act came to be, 
and that they present a host of difficult legal and even moral 
questions.  We need not reach those difficult questions given 
the discrete factual circumstances of this case.  We, 
nonetheless, cannot help but observe that this is, indeed, a 
new world.   
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I.  Background 
A.  Factual History 
 Robert Capato was born in the State of Washington in 
1957 and, aside from a ten-year period when he resided in 
California, lived in Washington until the 1990s.  Mr. Capato 
met his future wife, Karen, in Washington and subsequently 
moved with her to Colorado, where they lived for two years.  
In early 1999, the couple moved to Florida for Mr. Capato‘s 
business, and lived in Florida for approximately three years.  
At some point while in Florida, they decided to move to New 
Jersey and took some steps in that regard, but did not leave 
Florida prior to Mr. Capato‘s death.   
 
 In August 1999, shortly after the Capatos‘ wedding in 
New Jersey, Mr. Capato was diagnosed with esophageal 
cancer, and was told that the chemotherapy he required might 
render him sterile.  The Capatos, however, wanted children, 
and thus, before he began his course of chemotherapy, Mr. 
Capato deposited his semen in a sperm bank, where it was 
frozen and stored.  Somewhat surprisingly, given the 
treatment that Mr. Capato was by then undergoing, Ms. 
Capato conceived naturally and gave birth to a son in August 
2001.  The Capatos, however, wanted their son to have a 
sibling.   
 
 Mr. Capato‘s health deteriorated in 2001, and he died 
in Florida in March of 2002.  His death certificate listed his 
residence as Pompano Beach, Florida.  Three months before 
his death, he executed a will in Florida naming as his 
beneficiaries the son born of his marriage to Ms. Capato and 
two children from a prior marriage.  Although Ms. Capato 
claims that she and her husband spoke to their attorney about 
including ―unborn children‖ in the will, ―so that it would be 
understood that . . . they‘d have the rights and be supported in 
the same way that [their natural born son] was already 
privileged to,‖  App. at 288, the will did not contain any such 
provision.   
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 Shortly after Mr. Capato‘s death, Ms. Capato began in 
vitro fertilization using the frozen sperm of her husband.  She 
conceived in January 2003 and gave birth to twins on 
September 23, 2003, eighteen months after Mr. Capato‘s 
death.   
 
B.  Procedural History 
 In October 2003, Ms. Capato applied for surviving 
child‘s insurance benefits on behalf of the twins based on her 
husband‘s earnings record.  The Social Security 
Administration denied her claim, and Ms. Capato timely 
requested a hearing before an administrative law judge 
(―ALJ‖).  A hearing was held on May 30, 2007, with 
testimony taken from Ms. Capato and two friends.  On 
November 28, 2007, the ALJ rendered his decision denying 
Ms. Capato‘s claim.  Observing that ―[t]his is a case where 
medical-scientific technology has advanced faster than the 
regulatory process,‖ id. at 6, and that this is a ―very 
sympathetic case‖ in which ―allowing benefits would appear 
to be consistent with the purposes of the Social Security Act,‖ 
the ALJ nonetheless believed himself ―constrained by 
applicable laws and regulations to find disentitlement.‖  Id. at 
7.  Finding that the twins, conceived after the death of their 
father, ―are not for Social Security purposes the ‗child(ren)‘ 
of the deceased wage earner, Robert Capato, under Florida 
state law as required by section 216(h)(2)(A) of the Social 
Security Act,‖ the ALJ concluded that they were not entitled 
to child‘s insurance benefits in accordance with sections 
202(d)(1) and 216(e) of the Act and the relevant regulations.  
Id. at 8.  The District Court affirmed, echoing the ALJ‘s 
interpretation of the Act and his conclusion that Mr. Capato 
was domiciled in Florida on the date of his death and, thus, 
that Florida‘s law of intestacy should be applied.  This timely 
appeal, over which we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291, followed.  We will affirm in part and vacate in part, 
and remand for further proceedings.
1
   
                                                 
1
   We will affirm the dismissal of Ms. Capato‘s Equal 
Protection claim.  As the Ninth Circuit found in a similar 
challenge, ―the [Social Security Administration] is not 
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II.  Discussion 
A.  Standard of Review 
 We review de novo the District Court‘s decision to 
uphold the denial of benefits.  Boone v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 
203, 205 (3d Cir. 2003).  We review the ALJ‘s decision to 
assure that it was supported ―by substantial evidence in the 
record.‖  Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  ―Substantial 
evidence is more than a mere scintilla.  It means such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.‖  
Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  ―Where the ALJ‘s 
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we are 
bound by those findings, even if we would have decided the 
factual inquiry differently.‖  Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 
34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001).   
 
B.  Entitlement to Child’s Insurance Benefits 
 Title II of the Social Security Act, codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 401 et seq., allows certain categories of children to 
receive a survivor‘s benefit following the death of a ―fully or 
currently insured individual.‖  42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1).  The 
purpose of ―federal child insurance benefits‖ is not to provide 
general welfare benefits, but to ―replace the support that the 
                                                                                                             
excluding all posthumously-conceived children, only those 
that do not meet the statutory requirements under State law.‖  
Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2009).  Such 
a classification does not violate Equal Protection laws 
because it is reasonably related to the government‘s interest in 
assuring that survivor benefits reach children who depended 
on the support of a wage-earner and lost that support due to 
the wage-earner‘s death.  See id. (―[T]he challenged 
classifications are reasonably related to the government‘s 
twin interest in limiting benefits to those children who have 
lost a parent‘s support, and in using reasonable presumptions 
to minimize the administrative burden of proving dependency 
on a case-by-case basis.‖).   
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child would have received from his father had the father not 
died.‖  Jones ex rel. Jones v. Chater, 101 F.3d 509, 514 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (citing Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 507-08 
(1976)); see also Adams v. Weinberger, 521 F.2d 656, 659 
(2d Cir. 1975) (the purpose of the Act is to provide support to 
children who have lost ―actual‖ or ―anticipated‖ support).  In 
general, ―the [Act] is to be accorded a liberal application in 
consonance with its remedial and humanitarian aims.‖  
Eisenhauer v. Mathews, 535 F.2d 681, 686 (2d Cir. 1976).   
 
 To qualify for child‘s insurance benefits, the applicant 
must be the ―child,‖ as defined in § 416(e) of the Act, of an 
individual entitled to benefits or who is fully or currently 
insured.  42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1).  Section 416(e) defines 
―child‖ broadly as, in relevant part, ―the child or legally 
adopted child of an individual.‖  Id. § 416(e)(1).  
Additionally, and as relevant here, the ―child‖ (a) must have 
filed an application for benefits, (b) must be unmarried and 
less than eighteen years old (or an elementary or  secondary 
school student under nineteen), and (c) must have been 
dependent upon the deceased individual at the time of his or 
her death.  Id. §§ 402(d)(1)(A)-(C).  ―Every child (as defined 
in section 416(e) of this title)‖ will qualify, assuming, of 
course, that the other requisites have been met.  Id. § 
402(d)(1).   
 
 Section 416(h), entitled ―Determination of family 
status,‖ offers other ways by which to determine whether an 
applicant is a ―child‖:   
 
In determining whether an applicant is the child 
or parent of a fully or currently insured 
individual for purposes of this subchapter, the 
Commissioner of Social Security shall apply 
such law as would be applied in determining the 
devolution of intestate personal property by the 
courts of the State in which such insured 
individual is domiciled at the time such 
applicant files application or, if such insured 
individual is dead, by the courts of the State in 
which he was domiciled at the time of his death.   
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Id. § 416(h)(2)(A).   
 Moreover, if an applicant is unable to inherit from the 
deceased wage earner under state intestacy law, the Act 
provides three alternative mechanisms by which to deem the 
applicant a ―child‖ for purposes of survivor benefits.  These 
alternatives are, on their face, inapplicable here and are set 
forth only for completeness.  First, the applicant is deemed to 
be the ―child‖ of the insured individual if the applicant is the 
son or daughter and the covered parent went through a 
marriage ceremony that would have been valid but for a legal 
impediment.  Id. § 416(h)(2)(B).  Second, the applicant is 
deemed to be the ―child‖ where the insured individual, before 
death, either (a) acknowledged in writing that the applicant 
was his or her child; (b) was decreed by a court to be the 
mother or father of the applicant; or (c) was ordered by a 
court to pay child support.  Id. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i).  Third, the 
applicant is deemed to be the ―child‖ where the deceased 
individual is shown to be the mother or father, and the 
deceased individual was living with or contributing to the 
child‘s support at the time of death.  Id. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii).   
 
 Thus, ―child‖ is defined in different subsections of the 
Act -- § 416(e) and again in §§ 416(h)(2)(A), 416(h)(2)(B), 
and 416(h)(3).  Were we to determine that the § 416(h)(2)(A) 
definition of ―child‖ is appropriate here and go on to apply 
the law of intestacy of Florida, as the Commissioner argues 
we should, we would affirm.  But neither the Commissioner 
nor the District Court, who agreed with the Commissioner, 
has told us why, in the factual circumstances of this case, 
where there is no family status to determine, we would even 
refer to § 416(h).  Under § 402(d), the child is a ―child‖ as 
defined in § 416(e).  To accept the argument of the 
Commissioner, one would have to ignore the plain language 
of § 416(e) and find that the biological child of a married 
couple is not a ―child‖ within the meaning of § 402(d) unless 
that child can inherit under the intestacy laws of the domicile 
of the decedent.  There is no reason apparent to us why that 
should be so, and we join the Ninth Circuit in so concluding.   
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 In Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 
2004), a case factually identical to the case before us,
2
 the 
Ninth Circuit explained that §§ 416(h)(2) and (3) ―were added 
to the Act to provide various ways in which children could be 
entitled to benefits even if their parents were not married or 
their parentage was in dispute,‖ and have ―no relevance‖ for 
determining whether a claimant is the ―child‖ of a deceased 
wage earner where parentage is not in dispute.  371 F.3d at 
596.  The Commissioner conceded that Mr. Netting‘s children 
were his biological children, id. at 597, as here the 
Commissioner concedes that Mr. Capato‘s children are his.  
The Ninth Circuit found that the district court erred when it 
concluded that Mr. Netting‘s children were not ―children‖ for 
purposes of the Act.
3
   
 
 In response to Gillett-Netting, the Commissioner 
issued an ―Acquiescence Ruling,‖ effective September 22, 
2005.
4
  See Social Security Acquiescence Ruling 05-1(9), 70 
Fed. Reg. 55,656 (Sept. 22, 2005).  The Acquiescence Ruling 
                                                 
2
    The husband was diagnosed with cancer, was advised that 
chemotherapy might render him sterile, and his semen was 
frozen and stored in hopes that, even after he died, his wife 
would have his children.  His wife conceived by means of in 
vitro fertilization and gave birth to twins eighteen months 
after his death.   
3
   Because, in the case before us, the District Court did not 
reach the issue of dependency given its conclusion that the 
definition of ―child‖ was not satisfied, we, therefore, need not 
address the Ninth Circuit‘s conclusion that Mr. Netting‘s 
children were ―conclusively deemed dependent on [him] 
under the Act‖ and why that was thought to be so.  371 F.3d 
at 599.   
4
   ―An acquiescence ruling explains how we will apply a 
holding in a decision of a United States Court of Appeals that 
we determine conflicts with our interpretation of a provision 
of the Social Security Act (Act) or regulations when the 
Government has decided not to seek further review of that 
decision or is unsuccessful on further review.‖  See Social 
Security Acquiescence Ruling 05-1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656 
(Sept. 22, 2005).  
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limited the application of Gillett-Netting to claims within the 
Ninth Circuit.  Id. at 55,657.  It also contained a ―Statement 
as to How Gillett-Netting Differs From SSA‘s Interpretation 
of the Social Security Act.‖  Id.  In that Statement, the 
Commissioner hewed to the arguments she had made to the 
Ninth Circuit:  in all cases, § 416(h) ―provides the analytical 
framework that we must follow for determining whether a 
child is the insured‘s child for the purposes of section 
[416(e)],‖ and § 416(h)(2)(A) directs the application of state 
intestacy law or the alternative mechanisms in §§ 
416(h)(2)(B) and 416(h)(3)(C) to determine whether a child is 
a ―child.‖  Id.  An ―after-conceived‖ child, she continued, 
cannot satisfy the alternative mechanisms in §§ 416(h)(2)( B) 
and 416(h)(3)(C), and ―[c]onsequently, to meet the definition 
of ‗child‘ under the Act, an after-conceived child must be able 
to inherit under State law.‖  Id.  There was no explanation as 
to why the statute even suggests, much less compels, that 
result.     
 
 The Commissioner has attempted to explain to us why 
the Ninth Circuit‘s analysis of the Act‘s legislative history 
was ―indisputably mistaken.‖  The explanation goes as 
follows:  ―When child survivor benefits were established in 
1939, section 416(h)(2)(A) was the only way any child could 
be eligible for benefits.‖  Appellee‘s Br. at 34.  Because no 
effective means existed at that time to scientifically prove a 
child-parent relationship, Congress determined that the 
primary way to prove child status should be eligibility to 
inherit under state law.  Id.  Given that state laws would have 
provided for inheritance by the child of a marriage, that child 
would have no problem qualifying as the wage-earner‘s 
―child‖ for survivor benefits under the Act.  The 
Commissioner argues that even though Congress added § 
416(h)(3) in 1965 to provide additional ways by which a child 
could prove ―child‖ status, ―that addition did nothing to 
change the existing requirement that all children, even 
including children of married parents whose parentage was 
not in dispute, satisfy at least one of the provisions of section 
416(h).‖  Id. at 35.   
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 The explanation ignores the fundamental question:  
why should we, much less why must we, refer to § 416(h) 
when § 416(e) is so clear, and where we have before us the 
undisputed biological children of a deceased wage earner and 
his widow.  The plain language of §§ 402(d) and 416(e) 
provides a threshold basis for defining benefit eligibility.  The 
provisions of § 416(h) then provide for ―[d]etermination of 
family status‖—subsection (h)‘s heading—to determine 
eligibility where a claimant‘s status as a deceased wage-
earner‘s child is in doubt.  Were it the case that such status 
had to be determined here, we would turn to the relevant 
provisions of § 416(h).  But a basic tenet of statutory 
construction is that ―[i]n the absence of an indication to the 
contrary, words in a statute are assumed to bear their 
‗ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.‘‖  Walters v. 
Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207 (1997) (quoting 
Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 
U.S. 380, 388 (1993)).  The term ―child‖ in § 416(e) requires 
no further definition when all parties agree that the applicants 
here are the biological offspring of the Capatos.  Stated 
somewhat differently, we do not read §§ 402(d) or 416(e) as 
requiring reference to § 416(h) to establish child status under 
the facts of this case.  Our analysis does not render § 416(h) 
superfluous but, rather, places it in context with § 416(e) and 
the clear command of § 402(d)(1) to refer to § 416(e) to 
define the word ―child.‖5  
 
 We acknowledge that another factual scenario might 
render the Commissioner‘s concerns more persuasive.  Those 
concerns must, however, await another case, though we note 
them ourselves with some concern:   
 
[A]lthough biological paternity can now be 
scientifically proven to a near certain degree of 
                                                 
5
   Because we can resolve this issue based on our analysis of 
Congress‘ ―unambiguously expressed intent‖ in the statutory 
language, we need not determine whether the 
Commissioner‘s interpretation is a permissible construction 
of the statute.  See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).   
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probability, modern artificial reproduction 
technologies currently allow for variations in 
the creation of child-parent relationships which 
are not solely dependent upon biology.  The use 
of donor eggs, artificial insemination, and 
surrogate wombs could result in at least five 
potential parents.  Accordingly, even in modern 
times, the basic assumption underlying the 
Gillett-Netting panel‘s reasoning – i.e., that 
biological paternity always results in an 
‗undisputed‘ child-parent relationship – is 
unfounded.   
 
Appellee‘s Br. at 36 (internal citation omitted).   
 To be sure, as the Ninth Circuit put it, ―[d]eveloping 
reproductive technology has outpaced federal and state laws, 
which currently do not address directly the legal issues 
created by posthumous conception.‖  Gillett-Netting, 371 
F.3d at 595.  As we have noted, the more difficult of those 
legal issues are not before us.  What is before us is a discrete 
set of circumstances and the narrow question posed by those 
circumstances:  are the undisputed biological children of a 
deceased wage earner and his widow ―children‖ within the 
meaning of the Act?  The answer is a resounding ―Yes.‖  
Accordingly, we will vacate the order of the District Court in 
part and remand for a determination of whether, as of the date 
of Mr. Capato‘s death, his children were dependent or 
deemed dependent on him, the final requisite of the Act 
remaining to be satisfied.
6
   
 
                                                 
6
   Given this disposition, it is not necessary for us to 
determine where Mr. Capato was domiciled at his death or to 
delve into the law of intestacy of that state.  We note, 
however, that were we to decide the issue of domicile, we 
would likely conclude that it was Florida.   
